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IS THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS
INITIATIVE A WOLF IN SHEEP'S
CLOTHING?: DISTINGUISHING
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT FROM
REVISION IN CALIFORNIA'S
INITIATIVE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
In turn-of-the-century California, the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company had a stranglehold on state politics.1 To return control of
the government to the people, the progressive faction of the Republi-
can party led a statewide movement toward direct democracy In
1911 this movement culminated in the overwhelming adoption by
California voters of a constitutional amendment reserving to the
people the legislative power of initiative Currently, California is by
far the most active of the states that use the initiative process, and
"the initiative... has increasingly come to dominate California po-
litical culture."4  The California power of initiative allows the
"electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution
and to adopt or reject them."' As such, California is one of only a
few states permitting constitutional amendments by initiative.6 The
1. See JOSEPH R GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONsTIrUTION:
A REFERENCE GuIDE 69 (1993).
2 See id.
3. See id.
4. IL; see also Marilyn M. Minger, Comment, Putting the "Single" Back in
the Single-Subject Rule: A Proposal for Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 879, 879 (1991) ("[I]n March 1991 there were at least forty initia-
tive reform proposals pending in the [California] state legislature.").
5. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). The electors propose an initiative
by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets forth the text
of the... statute or amendment to the Constitution and is certified to
have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of
a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution,
of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial
election.
Id. § 8(b). "The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next
general election ... or at any special statewide election held prior to that general
election." Id. § 8(c).
6. See GRODIN, supra note 1, at 69. Also, California is the only state in
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initiative power, however, does not permit the people to make major,
far-reaching changes-so-called "revisions"-to their constitution.7
Theory holds that only the legislative houses should propose revi-
sions because they can draft and consider them with the more in-
formed judgment of experience and institutional competence!
Even so, California courts only rarely and reluctantly strike ini-
tiative measures as invalid attempts at constitutional revision.9 They
state that it is their "solemn duty to jealously guard the precious ini-
tiative power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of its ex-
ercise .... [A]ll presumptions favor the validity of initiative measures
and... such measures must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears."1 Whether this
"solemn duty" stems from the courts' reverence of the initiative
process or from their fear of angering the same voting public that
elects the justices to the bench will never be resolved. Over time,
however, the courts developed a two-part test to distinguish appro-
priate initiative amendment measures from invalid revisions." Be-
cause of their solemn duty-based on reverence or fear-to guard
the initiative power, courts apply this test very strictly, and initiative
measures almost always survive challenge, no matter what these ini-
tiatives may do.
Recently, the "people" of California crafted, 2 qualified, 3 and
which the legislature cannot modify a statutory amendment adopted by initiative
unless the initiative so provides. See id.
7. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; GRODIN, supra note 1, at 70.
& See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
9. The California Supreme Court has held only twice in modem history that
an initiative constituted a revision. See Joseph Goldberg, Note, Raven v. Deuk-
mejian: A Modern Guide to the Voter Initiative Process and State Constitutional
Independence, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729,729 (1991).
10. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 501, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 283,287 (1991).
11. See infra notes 42-93 and accompanying text.
12. Glynn Custred, a teacher in the California State University system, and
Tom Wood, the executive director of the California Association of Scholars,
authored the initiative. See Glynn Custred & Tom Wood, Racial, Gender Prefer-
ences Hurt Everybody, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1995, at A21.
13. See Dave Lesher, Preference Ban Qualifies for Fall Ballot, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1996, at A3. The CCRI "was officially qualified for the Nov. 5 ballot...
by Secretary of State Bill Jones." Id.; see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wil-
son, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1493 (N.D. Cal. 1996), preliminary injunction vacated, stay
denied as moot, remanded, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997) reh'g denied, 122 F.3d
692 (9th Cir. 1997), petition, for cert filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1997)
(No. 97-369), cert denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1997) (No. 97-396)
(explaining that, after qualifying as an initiative constitutional amendment,
Proposition 209 was placed on California's November 5, 1996, general election
[Vol. 31:261
CCRI A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?
passed'4 Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative
(CCRI), thereby "amending" their constitution. The CCRI's opera-
tive clause provides that "[tihe state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting."15 Pro-
ponents label the CCRI as an amendment that simply guarantees
"equality of opportunity" and eliminates the "group entitlements...
that underlie the current racial and ethnic spoils system.' 16 Oppo-
nents, however, fear that the initiative will affect far-reaching, nega-
tive, qualitative changes to the California Constitution beyond what
its supporters say to the press. 7
This Comment does not address the serious affirmative action is-
sues involved with the CCRI. Rather, it focuses on whether the
CCRI improperly revises, rather than amends, the California Consti-
tution. Section II outlines the permissible methods of amending and
revising the constitution. Section III details California's two-part test
for distinguishing constitutional amendment from revision. Section
IV concludes that the CCRI would not affect either a quantitative or
qualitative revision of the California Constitution under the current
test, even though it does propose substantial qualitative changes.
Section V states that California's safeguards against improper
revision by initiative fail and, furthermore, proposes changes to the
initiative process that would prevent misuse. Lastly, Section VI out-
lines some of the justifications which support the proposed changes
to the initiative constitutional amendment process.
II. CHANGING THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION: AMENDMENT
VERSUS REVISION
Changes to the California Constitution take two basic forms:
amendment and revision.8 Although the constitution itself does not
specifically define revision and amendment, 9 case law provides some
ballot).
14. "On November 5, 1996, the voters of California enacted Proposition 209
into law, with 4,736,180 votes (54%) cast in favor of the initiative and 3,986,196
votes (46%) cast in opposition." Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at
1495.
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
16. Custred & Wood, supra note 12, at A21.
17. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, Sex Discrimination Made
Legal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at B9.
18. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2.
19. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
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guidance. "[T]he term 'amendment' implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument [constitution] as
will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which
it was framed."' 2 Revisions, on the other hand, contemplate compre-
hensive changes to the constitution. A revision involves "far reach-
ing changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan, 2 and alters
the "underlying principles" upon which the constitution rests.2 Even
though the constitution does not specifically define revision or
amendment, it does lay out the procedures by which to accomplish
them.
A. Authority to Amend the California Constitution
The people of California vest the state's legislative power in the
legislature, but they "reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum. ' Courts label the people's reserved initiative
power as "one of the most precious rights of our democratic proc-
ess."24 The people's reserved power to change the constitution, how-
ever, extends only to amendments, not revisions.2? Article XVIII
states that "[t]he electors may amend the Constitution by initiative";
26
it does not allow revision. The legislature may likewise propose
amendments to the constitution by a two-thirds vote of each house."
The proposed amendment must then be submitted to the voters for
popular ratification.2 Amendments may also be initiated during a
constitutional convention proposed by the legislature and approved
by voters.29
B. Authority to Revise the California Constitution
Only the legislature may revise the California Constitution. It
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 222, 583 P.2d 1281, 1285, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 (1978).
20. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-19,36 P. 424,426 (1894).
21. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
22- Livermore, 102 Cal. at 118-19,36 P. at 426.
23. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
24. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 248,583 P.2d at 1302,149 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
25. See Livermore, 102 Cal. at 117,36 P. at 425-26; Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 221,
583 P.2d at 1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
26. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (emphasis added).
27. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
28. See id
29. See id. § 2. "If the majority [of citizens] vote yes on that question
[whether to hold a constitutional convention], within 6 months the Legislature
shall provide for the convention. Delegates to a constitutional convention shall
be voters elected from districts as nearly equal in population as may be practica-
ble." Id.
[Vol. 31:261
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may do so by legislative proposal and popular ratification, like the
amendment process above,' or by calling for a constitutional con-
vention approved by the voters. 1
1. Rationale: Why citizens may not revise the California
Constitution by initiative
The constitution grants the legislature alone the power of revi-
sion because comprehensive changes to the state's governmental
structure "require more formality, discussion and deliberation than is
available through the initiative process."
'
The very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that
the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like per-
manent and abiding nature.33
Therefore, the underlying principles and substantial entirety of the
constitution must not change unless the changes are carefully consid-
ered and debated by both legislative houses and then ratified by a
majority of the voters.
Unlike traditional legislation, initiatives do not undergo a
"systematic refining process, in which facts are collected, assumptions
challenged, and analysis performed."'34 Citizen drafters, not always
skillfully, write initiatives involving extensive and complex social is-
sues. These initiatives often serve the drafters' own interests rather
than those of society as a whole.
3
1
Fearing some of the same problems, the framers of the United
States Constitution rejected a direct, populist democracy36 in favor of
30. See id. § 1.
31. See id. § 2.
32. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,506, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316,286 Cal.
Rptr. 283,290 (1991).
33. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118,36 P. 424,426 (1894).
34. Minger, supra note 4, at 886 (citation omitted). "[T]he simple truth is that
representative lawmaking includes, as part of its process, formal deliberation and
debate. The state initiative process does not." Catherine A. Rogers & David L.
Faigman, "And to the Republic for Which it Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican
Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1063 (1996).
35. See Minger, supra note 4, at 886.
36. See Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to
Make Fools of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A
Local Government Perspective, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 47, 48 (1995). James
Madison described a pure, populist democracy as a "society consisting of a small
November 1997]
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republican, representative government7 that would, as James Madi-
son wrote, "enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
[partisan] considerations."38  The Constitution's Guarantee Clause
embodies this idea and assures that "[t]he United States shall guaran-
tee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment."39
One form of direct democracy is legislation by initiative.' This
Comment will not address whether the initiative process itself vio-
lates the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of govern-
ment, a topic of much debate.4 But, 'to avoid a major reshaping of
California's Constitution, government, and society, under the influ-
ence of the inherent problems and dangers explained above, the
people should not directly legislate constitutional revisions-
substantial changes-using the initiative process. Instead, these
changes should flow from the legislative houses or a constitutional
convention where ideas can be refined and enlarged and can evolve
into appropriate responses to complex, difficult policy matters.
III. DISTINGUISHING AMENDMENT FROM REVISION: CALIFORNIA'S
TWO-PART TEST
Because the people may use their initiative power to amend but
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person,"
rather than elected officials who gather to represent everyone. THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
37. James Madison defined a republic as "a government in which the scheme
of representation takes place." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 (James Madi-
son) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be ex-
tended.
IL at 133-34.
3& Id. at 134.
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
40. See Warner, supra note 36, at 48.
41. See Rogers & Faigman, supra note 34, at 1059 (concluding that the mod-
em state initiative process is a per se violation of the Guarantee Clause). Com-
pare Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popu-
lar Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 COLO. L. REV.
749 (1994) (arguing that the initiative does not violate the Guarantee Clause be-
cause the essential aspect of republican government is majority rule).
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not revise the constitution, California courts have developed a two-
part test to distinguish amendment from revision within the defini-
tions noted above. Courts examine the face of the measure in ques-
tion in order to determine the quantitative and qualitative effects of
the proposed changes.4'
A. Part I: Quantitative Effects Test
The first part of the amendment/revision test asks whether the
proposed "enactment... is so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the Constitution by the deletion
or alteration of numerous existing provisions."43 A court looks only
at the number of constitutional provisions changed or deleted and
does not consider what substantive effect any of the changes could
have.
For example, the California Supreme Court found that an initia-
tive "consist[ing] of 12 separate sections ... in the nature of separate
articles divided into some 208 subsections.., set forth in more than
21,000 words"" which would repeal or alter "at least 15 of 25 arti-
cles"45 was an invalid attempt at revision.46 Conversely, a measure
having "limited quantitative effect, repealing only one constitutional
section ... and adding another ... was not 'so extensive ... as to
change directly the "substantial entirety" of the Constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."' 47 The initia-
tive in question properly attempted to amend rather than revise the
constitution.4' The California Supreme Court also upheld a proposed
initiative amendment "compris[ing] approximately 400 words and...
limited to [a] ... single subject."49
42. See Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 506-10, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316-
19, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290-93 (1991).
43. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 223, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1978).
44. McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330,334, 196 P.2d 787,790 (1948).
45. Id. at 345, 196 P.2d at 796.
46. See id
47. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,260, 651 P.2d 274,288, 186 Cal. Rptr.
30, 44 (1982) (quoting Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-19, 36 P. 424, 429
(1894)).
48. See id. at 261, 651 P.2d at 289, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
49. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 224,583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244; see also
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 351-52, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086-87, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 335-36 (1990) (holding that an initiative deleting no existing constitu-
tional language and affecting only one article was not so quantitatively extensive
as to amount to a constitutional revision but holding that the initiative was a
qualitative revision).
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1. The single-subject rule
Although the quantitative effects test seems very mechanical, a
related component of the initiative amendment process-the single-
subject rule-offers some insight into its rationale. Under the Cali-
fornia Constitution, "[a]n initiative measure embracing more than
one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any ef-
fect."50 In other words, voters should consider and vote on issues in-
dependently. Narrowly focused issues, instead of broad, compound,
complicated ones, help voters to understand what they are voting for
and encourage informed discussion of those issues." The single-
subject rule "keep[s] the initiative process under control."SZ Its de-
sign prevents logrolling," vote dilution,- and voter confusion.5
In limiting the number of constitutional provisions that a single
initiative may add, delete, or alter, the quantitative effects test
touches on many of the same issues as the single-subject rule. The
quantitative limitation, while restricting the physical scope of an ini-
tiative, in turn helps to assure that provisions are narrowly focused
and understandable by voters, rather than complex and inscrutable.
Like the single-subject rule, the quantitative effects test effectively
combats logrolling, vote dilution, and voter confusion as described
above. The quantitative limitation helps to keep constitutional
changes by initiative "under control. 56 A voting public better able to
50. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
51. See Minger, supra note 4, at 895.
52- Id.
53. "Logrolling" denotes two different methods of misleading voters in the
initiative process. Id. at 885. First, "coalition-building logrolling" occurs when
initiative drafters include disparate provisions encouraging minority factions to
join in support of a measure so that it passes. Id. Thus, individual measures not
having majority support are able to win approval. A second type of logrolling
occurs when drafters bury an unpopular provision-a rider-in a very complex
or popular measure. See id They do this hoping that the popular provision will
"carry the unpopular provision into law or that the complex measure will obfus-
cate the issue." Id.
54. When a voter must cast a single yes or no vote to decide many issues, the
power of that vote is diluted. See id. at 892. Voters may end up approving a
portion of a proposal that they would not have had they been able to vote on is-
sues separately. See id. Citizens cannot consider and vote on issue separately
but rather must decide whether to approve a compound proposal by somehow
balancing portions they want greatly against those they do not favor. See id.
55. See id. at 886-92.
56. The quantitative effects limitation perhaps keeps better control of initia-
tive amendments than the single-subject rule. The California Supreme Court
employs a very lenient test to determine whether a provision encompasses a sin-
gle subject. "[A]n initiative measure will not violate the single-subject require-
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analyze and discuss more focused initiative proposals can perhaps
identify and reject constitutional amendments' driven solely by the
"temporary or partial considerations' that James Madison and the
framers of the United States Constitution feared.
B. Part II: Qualitative Effects Test
The second part of the amendment/revision test investigates a
proposal's qualitative effects and asks whether it would "accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision."59 Even a very simple, short proposal
not affecting widespread deletions, additions, or changes can have a
drastic qualitative effect. For instance, "an enactment which pur-
ported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a
revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the
measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by
such change. '
In Raven v. Deukmejian" the court invalidated a proposed ini-
tiative under the qualitative branch of the test. The initiative affected
only one article of the constitution but required California courts to
construe "certain enumerated criminal law rights ...consistently
with the United States Constitution and ... to afford [no] greater
rights to criminal or juvenile defendants than [were] afforded by the
federal Constitution."62 The initiative would have vested all judicial
power relating to criminal defense rights in the Federal Constitution
and United States Supreme Court and divested the California judici-
ment if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are 'reasonably ger-
mane' to each other." Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 230,583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr.
at 248 (emphasis added); see Minger, supra note 4 (arguing that courts should
apply the single-subject requirement more strictly); see also Raven v. Deukme-
jian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 356-66, 801 P.2d 1077, 1090-97, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 339-46
(1990) (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting) (concurring that the initiative improp-
erly attempted to revise the California Constitution but dissenting and arguing
that the initiative also violated the single-subject rule).
57. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 739-40. "Lack of knowledge and interest in
the initiative measure will prevent rational voting. Many times the subject matter
and language of the initiative are so complex or lengthy that it [the initiative] may
never be thoroughly read or completely understood." Id. at 740 (footnote omit-
ted).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1966).
59. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 223, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1978).
60. Id.
61. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077,276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
62. Id. at 342-43, 801 P.2d at 1081, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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ary of all authority in this area.' It would have deprived the Califor-
nia Constitution of its "substance and integrity... as a document of
independent force," would have affected an underlying principle of
the constitution,5 and would have accomplished an impermissible
revision.'
On the other hand, in People v. Frierson67 the California Su-
preme Court held that an initiative placing language in the constitu-
tion stating that the death penalty was a permissible punishment was
an amendment rather than a revision.' Much like the initiative in
Raven, the Frierson initiative, in essence, "required California courts
deciding capital cases to [read] the state's 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause' consistently with the federal Constitution. 6 9 The court
held, however, that even after passage, the judiciary "retain[ed]
broad powers of judicial review of death sentences . .. [and] unre-
stricted authority to measure and appraise the constitutionality of the
death penalty under the federal Constitution."7 This change did not
affect the underlying principles of the California Constitution and
was "not so broad as to constitute a fundamental... revision.",
71
In Raven the court believed that the challenged measure was too
fundamental a change in the preexisting governmental plan to occur
through the initiative process.7 The initiative was a broad attack on
the state court's authority to interpret and enforce criminal rights un-
der the California Constitution. As such, it constituted a revision and
deserved, at the very least, the consideration, debate, and institu-
tional competence of the legislature before proposal and ratifica-
tion.n3 On the other hand, although the measure in Frierson also re-
quired California courts to defer to the United States Supreme Court
63. See id. at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
64. Id
65. "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
66. See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
67. 25 Cal. 3d 142,599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
68. See id. at 187, 599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
69. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 739.
70. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 187,599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
71. Id.; see also Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1982) (holding that the initiative known as the Victims' Bill of Rights
was a proper amendment of the constitution rather than an invalid revision).
72. See Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354-55, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text for rationale.
73. Some argue, however, that even if the legislature initiated the Raven
measure, it would probably violate the California Constitution's mandate of state
constitutional independence. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 738-39.
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and Constitution, it involved only an isolated subject.74 The Frierson
initiative targeted capital cases alone rather than criminal rights as a
whole.75 In contrast to Raven, the Frierson measure did not achieve
far-reaching, fundamental changes in California's governmental plan
by vesting a great deal of state judicial power in the federal system.76
The Frierson initiative thus qualified as an amendment which the
people alone were permitted to propose and ratify,. while the Raven
initiative did not."
The distinctions drawn by the courts between the Raven and Fri-
erson initiatives seem strained-both vest discretion of the California
judiciary in the United States Constitution and Supreme Court. Per-
haps California politics at the time of the Frierson initiative can help
to explain them.
In 1972, in People v. Anderson, the California Supreme Court
found that the death penalty was cruel and unusual and that it vio-
lated the California Constitution.79 At that time the court noted that
the death penalty was "unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state
and [was] incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial proc-
ess." This outlawing of capital punishment angered the people of
California who supported the death penalty in large numbers, and
"[t]he clear intent of the electorate in adopting section 27 [the Frier-
son initiative providing that capital punishment was constitutional in
California] was to circumvent Anderson."81
When making their ruling, the Frierson justices most likely real-
ized that "[a]lmost always, the political winds blow in favor of execu-
tion."' 2 These justices face election, and "[w]hile some public officials
have been elected despite anti-death-penalty beliefs, they are the ex-
ception rather than the rule."" Simply, these justices wanted to keep
their jobs. To invalidate the Frierson initiative, which helped revital-
74. See Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 186-87, 599 P.2d at 613-14, 158 Cal. Rptr. at
307-08.
75. See i
76. See id,
77. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
79. 6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
80. Id. at 656,493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
81. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 185, 599 P.2d at 612, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
82. Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REv. 311,
362 (1996). Surveys show that approximately 80% of Americans favor the death
penalty. See id.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
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ize capital punishment in California, could have hurt their chances at
the polls. Indeed, just seven years later, the California electorate
voted California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of
her colleagues out of office following a period where the "California
Supreme Court had reversed sixty-four of the sixty-eight capital sen-
tences it had reviewed." 84
Even in the face of these politics, the strained distinction stands,
and Raven remains the only example of an initiative struck down as
an invalid attempt at qualitative revision." But when measuring any
initiative against the court's amendment/revision tests, it is important
to keep in mind the politics of the day and the driving forces behind
the initiative in question. It appears that they can also affect the out-
come of an amendment/revision challenge and the validity of a con-
stitutional change by initiative.
C. The Revision Must Appear on the Face of the Challenged Measure:
An Overlay on the Qualitative and Quantitative Effects Tests
Citing earlier California Supreme Court decisions, the court in
Legislature v. Eu explained a component of the amendment/revision
test that overlays both the quantitative and qualitative parts. "[T]o
find... a revision, it must necessarily or inevitably appear from the
face of the challenged provision that the measure will substantially
alter the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitu-
tion."'' Although the initiative's challengers predicted a weakened
legislature resulting in a profound change in government structure
from the proposed term limits and budgetary restraints, the Eu court
rejected their argument. It noted that these "long-term consequences
... [and] future effects of that measure.., are simply unfathomable
at this time."" To the court, the consequences predicted by the ini-
tiative's challengers were simply "conjectural and speculative." 9
Because courts do have a "solemn duty to jealously guard the
precious initiative power," the Eu court held that the "very uncer-
tainty [of the consequences] inhibit[ed the court] from holding that a
84. Id. at 363.
85. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 729 (noting that courts have only struck
down two initiatives as improper revisions).
86. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991).
87. Id. at 510, 816 P.2d at 1319, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 511, 816 P.2d at 1319, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
90. Id. at 501, 816 P.2d at 1313, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
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constitutional revision ha[d] occurred in this case."'" Courts "must
[resolve] ... all doubts in favor of the initiative process." 2 So, courts
cannot, based on pure conjecture, find an impermissible revision. If,
however, an initiative such as the one in Eu "ultimately produces
grave, undesirable consequences to our governmental plan, the Legis-
lature or the people are empowered to propose a new constitutional
amendment to correct the situation."'' The courts, however, will not
interfere.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE: AMENDMENT
OR REVISION?
Is the CCRI an attempt to improperly revise the California Con-
stitution by initiative? The CCRI is a short provision with language
that appears straightforward.
THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant prefer-
ential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contract-
ing.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the
section's effective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting
bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.
91. Id. at 510, 816 P.2d at 1319, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 293; see also Brosnahan v.
Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (stating that the
court would not speculate on the effect of Proposition 8, an initiative, and that
the mere possibility that it might result in substantial change to government
functions is not a proper ground for invalidating the measure); Amador Valley
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d
1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (stating that the challenged initiative was not an
improper revision because nothing on its face necessarily or inevitably compelled
the dire consequences predicted by the challengers).
92. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 512, 816 P.2d at 1320, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis
added).
93. Id (citations omitted).
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(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidat-
ing any court order or consent decree which is in force as of
the effective date of this section.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting
action which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibil-
ity for any federal program, where ineligibility would result
in a loss of federal funds to the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but
not necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city,
county, city and county, public university system, including
the University of California, community college district,
school district, special district, or any other political subdi-
vision or governmental instrumentality of or within the
state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall
be the same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available
for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination
law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts
of this section are found to be in conflict with federal law or
the United States Constitution, the section shall be imple-
mented to the maximum extent that federal law and the
United States Constitution permit. Any provision held in-
valid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this
section. 4
Although short and seemingly simple, this powerful language
would drastically change a number of fundamental constitutional
tenets. Current jurisprudence, however, would not recognize the
CCRI as either a quantitative or qualitative revision of the California
Constitution. Thus, presently the CCRI qualifies as an acceptable
initiative amendment of the California Constitution.
94. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
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In addition, the politics that appeared to influence the court in
People v. Frierson95 could also come into play here.96 Fifty-four per-
cent of voters approved the CCRI,' and a court invalidation of the
initiative would upset those voters. Justices facing reelection would
likely have this in the back of their minds as they reviewed the CCRI.
A. The CCRI Would Not Affect a Quantitative Revision of the
California Constitution
Does the CCRI affect a quantitative revision of the California
Constitution by affecting its substantial entirety? The CCRI consists
of approximately 300 words, adds one section containing eight sub-
sections,98 and, on its face, affects approximately two sections of the
current California Constitution." It deals with only one subject-
equal protection.0 The quantitative effect of the CCRI is similar to
that of the questioned measure in Amador Valley Joint Union High
School District v. State Board of Equalization, which also contained
approximately 400 words and dealt with only a single subject-
taxation." The quantitative effect of the CCRI also resembles the
quantitative effect of the initiative in Raven v. Deukmejian, which
deleted no existing constitutional language and affected only one ar-
ticle.1 2 Both the Raven and Amador courts held that the challenged
initiatives did not constitute quantitative constitutional revisions."
In contrast, the court in McFadden v. Jordan labeled an initiative
containing over 21,000 words, 208 subsections, and affecting 15 of 25
articles of the California Constitution an improper attempt at a
quantitative revision."' Accordingly, the 300-word CCRI resembles
those validated in Amador and Raven and does not seem so extensive
as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by
95. 25 Cal. 3d 142,599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
96. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 200.
98. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
99. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preliminary Report on the Impact of the Pro-
posed California Civil Rights Initiative (last modified June 1, 1996)
<http://www.aclu-sc.org/ccri.html> (stating that the CCRI would amend Article I,
§§ 7-8, California's equal protection and nondiscrimination provisions).
100. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
101. See 22 Cal. 3d 208, 224, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244
(1978).
102 See 52 Cal. 3d 336, 351, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 335-36
(1990).
103. See id.; Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 224,583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
104. See McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330,334, 196 P.2d 787,790 (1948).
November 1997]
276 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. As such,
the CCRI would not affect a quantitative revision of the California
Constitution.
B. The CCRI Would Not Affect a Qualitative Revision of the
California Constitution
The qualitative analysis looks at the language of the CCRI and
its substantive effect on the California Constitution. CCRI clause (a)
provides that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant pref-
erential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting."'0'5 The CCRI's
remaining sections mandate exceptions to clause (a), remedies, and
other provisions to implement clause (a). Does the CCRI affect a
qualitative revision of the California Constitution so as to make far-
reaching changes in the nature of California's basic governmental
plan? The inquiry is much more complex than the quantitative one.
This section approaches the analysis from equal protection and sepa-
ration of powers angles-both fundamental principles of the Cali-
fornia government and Constitution. Although the CCRI effects im-
portant qualitative changes in these areas, current California law
would not recognize or invalidate the initiative as an impermissible
constitutional revision.
1. Equal protection for gender discrimination
California's equal protection guarantees flow from two sections
of its constitution. Article 1, section 7 states: "A person may not be.
•. denied equal protection... ."'06 According to Article 1, section 8,
"A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a busi-
ness, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed,
color, or national or ethnic origin."" In addition, both the California
Constitution-before the CCRI-and case law treat gender as a sus-
pect classification.Y"' Therefore, when the government uses gender-
105. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
106. Id. § 7.
107. Id. § 8.
108. See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 339 (1971). In this case, the California Supreme Court looked at other clas-
sifications designated as suspect by the United States Supreme Court and found
that gender was "properly placed among them." Id. at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 340.
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait... locked by the acci-
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based criteria in its decisions, the standard of review is strict scru-
tiny.'o "[T]he state bears the burden of establishing not only that it
has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinc-
tions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." ° Courts
frequently refer to this level of review as strict in scrutiny, fatal in
fact-meaning that challenged measures rarely, if ever, satisfy its re-
quirements."' Thus, pre-CCRI, the California Legislature and people
faced a daunting, if not insurmountable burden, when choosing to
enact laws containing any sort of gender-based classification.
In contrast, although clause (a) of the CCRI mandates a total
prohibition of discrimination and preferential treatment,"' clause (c)
allows "bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public edu-
cation, or public contracting.""13 "This is language characteristic of
rational basis review .. . [which] is enormously deferential to the
government and rarely are government actions invalidated under
it.""14 Although CCRI proponents argue otherwise, 5 many agree
dent of birth [and is a characteristic which] frequently bears no relationto ability to perform or contribute to soiety.... [T]he whole class is
relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities orcharacteristics of its individual members .. .[wihere the relation be-
tween characteristic and evil to be prevented is ... tenuous ....[O]utdated social stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices[and] the stigma of infenority and second class citizenship associated
with them.... H]istoricaly [women have] labored under severe legaland social disabilities.
Id. at 18-19, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
109. See id. at 17,485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
110. Id/. at 16-17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (citations omitted).
111. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "conventional 'strict scrutiny' [is] scrutiny that is strict in the-ory, but fatal in fact").
112 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). "The state shall not discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnity or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." Id.
113. Id. § 31(c) (emphasis added).
114. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 7.
115. See David B. Oppenheimer, Affirmative Deception Redux: Crossing
Swords over Clause (c) of the CCRI, THE RECORDER, May 22, 1996, at 5. Sup-
porters say that clause (c)'s initial words, "Nothing in this section," limit its effectto the CCRI only, and that clause (c) would not modify any other provisions of
the constitution. See id. They argue that the CCRI is "solely limited to abolish-
ing preferences." CALIFORNIA CIvIL RIGHTS INITIATIVEYES ON PROPOSITION
209, CLAUSE (C): WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT'S INCLUDED (1996). Since equal pro-
tection provisions are one section of the state constitution, and the CCRI would
become a separate section, the CCRI would not affect the equal protection pro-
visions which currently "restrict all classifications based on sex to those that meet
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that, as a constitutional modification, the "CCRI would change the
standard of review in gender discrimination cases and substantially
lessen the constitutional protection against sex-based discrimination
in education, contracting, and employment .... [The] CCRI would
eviscerate the California Constitution's current protection against
gender discrimination.,
116
As a recent and specific constitutional provision, the CCRI
would control those currently in place.'17
[A]ny court dealing with an issue of discrimination or pref-
erence in the area of contracting, education, or employment
will be required to apply its provisions and not the prior
California Constitution which it modifies. Thus, any court
dealing with any issue of gender discrimination... under
the California Constitution will be required to apply clause
(c).
118
Would this evisceration of California's protection against gender
discrimination affect a qualitative revision of the constitution? The
CCRI constitutionalizes language that severely diminishes the civil
rights of women and restructures the political process, making it very
difficult for women to restore these lost rights and protections or
even attain the same level of protection that other groups enjoy un-
der California law.
For example, suppose the CCRI had not been proposed, and the
California Supreme Court decided itself to lessen only protection
against gender discrimination by changing the equal protection stan-
dard of review from strict scrutiny to rational basis. Here, because
the court's holding does not become part of the constitution, women
could "petition... government representatives to... amend [the new
standard] or retain [the old standard] ... [and would face] the same
burdens as those faced by any constituent seeking preferential [or
equal] treatment for any group. ' 19 "Typically, this burden involves
the strict scrutiny test." Id. The existing equal protection provisions, they claim,
would "remain in full force." Id.
116. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 7 (emphasis added).
117. See Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 510, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319, 286
Cal. Rptr. 283, 293 (1991) (stating that the California Constitution is changed by
a measure that on its face alters its terms).
118. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 7. This Comment does not address the
Federal Supremacy Clause issues also affecting the standard of review for gender
discrimination.
119. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 (N.D. Cal.
1996), preliminary injunction vacated, stay denied as moot, remanded, 110 F.3d
1431 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert.
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directly petitioning and lobbying the specific representatives or poli-
cymakers with authority"'' to make such changes. Only a "simple
majority vote [of the legislative body] or executive decision" would
be needed to overrule the court's holding.12" ' The women petitioners
could also use this same procedure if either a legislative or initiative
statute had changed the standard of review to strict scrutiny.'2
On the other hand, if the language lowering the standard of pro-
tection for only gender discrimination was adopted in a constitutional
amendment, like the CCRI, women "who wish to petition their gov-
ernment [to change the standard] . . . face a considerably more
daunting burden. '""u To restore their equal protection rights, they
would have to amend the California Constitution either by initiative
or by supermajority legislative proposal and voter ratification.'l This
places a very heavy burden on women that other groups, not similarly
affected by the constitutional amendment, would not have to over-
come.lu Other groups interested in changing their equal protection
standard of review, as in the case above, would need only to petition
their legislature for simple majority approval of their request. No
constitutional amendment, legislative supermajority, or voter ratifi-
cation is needed. As in this example, by constitutionalizing rational
basis review for gender discrimination, the CCRI restructures the
normal legislative process to essentially exclude women on the issue
of equal protection.'2'
filed 66 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1997) (No. 97-369), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1997) (No. 97-396).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1498-99.
125. See id. In 1996 amending the constitution by initiative required the gath-
ering of 693,230 valid signatures and approximately 50% more "raw" signatures.
See id. at 1498. The costs of obtaining sufficient valid signatures and minimally
staffing a few offices just to qualify an initiative for submission to voters runs
from $500,000 to $1.5 million. See id. Then, a majority of voters must approve
the initiative. See id. In California, "[t]o reach at least 10 million voters directly,
a campaign would have to talk to 1,000 voters each day for 30 years." Id- at 1499.
A legislative constitutional amendment must garner two-thirds approval by both
the California Senate and Assembly and then, in the next statewide election, by a
majority of voters. See id. at 1498-99. This is also extremely time-consuming and
expensive. See id.
126. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution precluding any government action to protect ho-
mosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment made it
more difficult for one group of citizens, homosexuals, to seek aid from the gov-
ernment).
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James Madison's fears of a pure democracy echo strongly here. '2
The CCRI involves complex social issues that its drafters and Cali-
fornia voters feel very strongly about but perhaps are not qualified
and do not have the constitutional authority to impose on the whole
of society. Whether because of unskilled drafting, misunderstanding
of the measure and the constitution, or desire, the "people" have ef-
fectively pushed women outside of the normal political process for
equal protection legislation. With such possible serious conse-
quences, no matter what they result from, it seems imperative to
"enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true in-
terest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial [partisan] consid-
erations. ' ' 2n The CCRI should qualify as a constitutional revision and
require legislative proposal.
Although the CCRI constitutionalizes language that seriously
disadvantages women, it does not, however, under the current test,
amount to a revision. The CCRI does not accomplish the type of far-
reaching changes in the nature of California's basic governmental
plan like those identified by the Raven court, the only example of an
invalid qualitative revision by initiative.129 The CCRI does not vest
all judicial power in the legislature nor does it deprive the California
Constitution of its substance and integrity by linking a large portion
of it to federal law. According to the California courts, only these
types of qualitative changes amount to impermissible revisions.'
The CCRI is a more "isolated" provision resembling the initia-
tive measure upheld by the Frierson court as a valid amendment.'
The Frierson initiative amendment dealt only with capital punish-
ment and was "not so broad as to constitute a fundamental... revi-
sion."'32 Likewise, since the CCRI "only" reduces the California
Constitution's equal protection guarantee and changes the normal
political process for one class of people, it therefore permissibly
amends, rather than revises, the constitution under current jurispru-
dence.
127. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1966).
129. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
131. See People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1979).
132. Id. at 187,599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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2. Separation of powers
The separation of powers doctrine is rooted in the writings of
Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu and John Locke." Montes-
quieu described a tyrannical government as one where a single indi-
vidual acting without law "draws everything along by his will and his
caprices,' 34 and Locke noted that "[w]here-ever Law ends, Tyranny
begins., 13' The separation of powers doctrine establishes that none of
the three branches of the government can exercise or unduly restrict
the power vested or inherent in another branch.1 36 An important
function of the doctrine is to prevent the type of tyranny that Mon-
tesquieu and Locke discussed.' If an established government branch
can only act "in accordance with general rules set down in advance by
others, the [branch's] opportunities for arbitrary [tyrannical] action
are reduced.' ' 31 On the other hand, if the same branch performs ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial functions, the opportunities for arbi-
trary, discriminatory, and tyrannical action increase significantly.
3
1
In accordance with this, the California Constitution provides that
"[t]he powers of state government are legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not ex-
ercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution."'"
The constitution also defines the membership of each of the three
branches and the type of power each branch can exercise.1 41 "The su-
preme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor...
[who] shall see that the law is faithfully executed."' 42 "The judicial
power.., is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior
courts, municipal courts, and justice courts."'43  "The legislative
133. See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections
on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DuKE L.J. 1, 39-40.
134. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrr OF THE LAWS bk. 2,
ch. 1, at 10 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans., eds. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
135. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 400 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1960) (emphasis omitted).
136. See Alfred M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of Separation of Powers and the
Bargaining Game: Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges and Plaintiffs in Insti-
tutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685, 694-96 (1984).
137. See Quint, supra note 133, at 40.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
141. "The legislative power makes the laws, and then, after they are so made,
the judiciary expounds and the executive executes them." Stanley Mosk, Raven
and Revision, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 16 (1991) (citation omitted).
142. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
143. Id. at art. VI, § 1.
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power of this State is vested in the California Legislature[,] ... but
the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and refer-
endum."144
a. the CCRI's effect on the judicial branch's essential function of
interpreting and enforcing the constitution
By reserving the power of initiative and referendum, the people
of California are able to exercise a limited amount of legislative
power.1 45 When the "people" of California proposed the CCRI, they
exercised their reserved legislative power.1" The people acting as
legislature drafted clause (g) which states "the remedies available for
violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured
party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise
available for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination
law."'147 This section not only prohibits the California courts from
using sex- or race-based remedies to enforce clause (a) of the CCRI,
but its broad language also forbids courts from using them to enforce
any other constitutional or statutory provision, including federal law.
In addition, clause (d), in stating that "[n]othing in this section shall
be interpreted as invalidating any court order or consent decree
which is in force as of the effective date of this section,"' provides that
the CCRI can be used to invalidate any court order or decree entered
after the CCRI's effective date. Does the CCRI allow the people
acting as the legislature to divest the California judiciary of an impor-
tant part of its inherent and essential power to enforce the constitu-
tion and therefore revise the basic separation of powers in the Cali-
fornia government?
It is "[t]he obligation of the judicial branch of government to en-
force the provisions of the constitution even as against legislative and
executive actions." '  Courts have an inherent power to enforce
144. Id. at art. IV, § 1.
145. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
147. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 31(g).
148. Id. § 31(d) (emphasis added).
149. County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 726, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825,
852 (1973) (citing with approval Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)); see also Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 478 (Pa. 1969) (holding that it is
the "traditional and inherent power of the Courts to decide all questions of Con-
stitutionality"); Mosk, supra note 141, at 16 (citation omitted) ("The judiciary,
from the very nature of its powers and the means given it by the Constitution,
must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort .... ").
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constitutional rights, and the "fundamental separation of powers doc-
trine embodied in article III, section 3 of the California Constitution
... forbids any... legislative usurption of traditional judicial author-
ity."'1 "It would be idle to make the Constitution the supreme law,
and then require the judges to take the oath to support it, and after
all that, require the Courts to take the legislative construction as cor-
rect."' ' The ability to order a specific remedy or punishment can be
an integral part of the judiciary's inherent powers.'1 2 If so, the legisla-
ture, or people acting by initiative, may not deprive the courts of
their important remedy without transgressing separation of powers.
For example, the Florida Supreme Court observed "that the
power to punish for contempt exists independently of any statutory
grant of authority[,] as essential to the execution and maintenance of
judicial authority."" This is because "courts have authority to do
things that are absolutely essential to the performance of their judi-
cial functions."' 4 Relying on a decision by the United States Su-
preme Court, the Florida court noted that the exercise of the con-
tempt power is subject to reasonable regulation [by the legislature,
but] "the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable
from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inopera-
tive."'55 The court held that the legislature violated the doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in the Florida Constitution when it
attempted to forbid courts from using indirect criminal contempt. 6
The legislature's order "constitute[d] an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on a court's inherent power.., to carry out the judicial function
of punishing by indirect criminal contempt."' 7
The race- and sex-based remedies eliminated by CCRI clauses
(g) and (d) resemble contempt. They are an integral part of the
150. Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 547, 629 P.2d 935, 944, 174 Cal. Rptr.
841, 850 (1981) (holding invalid a legislative redetermination of damages already
adjudicated by court).
151. Mosk, supra note 141, at 16 (citation omitted).
152 See People v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 789 (1996) (holding that if the statute covering dismissal of prior felony of-
fenses were interpreted to allow court to take action only upon motion of prose-
cuting attorney, statute would violate separation of powers, and interpreting
three strikes statute in accordance, so as not to violate separation of powers).
153. Walker v. Bently, 660 So. 2d 313, 318 (Fla. 1995).
154. Id. at 320 (quoting Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1113
(Fla. 1986)).
155. Id. at 319 (quoting Young v. United States (ex reL Vuitton Fils S.A.), 481
U.S. 787,799 (1987) (emphasis omitted)).
156. See id. at 316-17.
157. Id. at 320.
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California courts' essential, inherent duty to enforce and interpret the
constitution, specifically the equal protection guarantees.'58 By com-
pletely forbidding the use of these remedies, the people, acting as the
legislature, have usurped the judiciary's inherent power to enforce its
constitutional obligation.159 Therefore, the CCRI would drastically
change the separation of powers provision contained in article III,
section 3.'60 By permitting the people, acting as legislature, to usurp
essential judicial power, the CCRI appears to accomplish far-
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan.
Under current law, however, the CCRI does not affect a qualita-
tive revision of the separation of powers mandate of the California
Constitution. Again, courts are duty-bound to uphold the people's
precious power of initiative whenever possible. California citizens
have a "sovereign right to impose restrictions on the judiciary. '1 6'
Only when such restrictions are so broad and fundamental that they
rise to the level of a constitutional revision do the people lose this
right.
62
The CCRI does not attempt a qualitative change in the judiciary
nearly so broad as the one invalidated in Raven.'6' The Raven meas-
ure would have "abolished the doctrine of independent state grounds
with respect to at least thirty-two constitutional rights,"' 4 by vesting
much of the California judiciary's institutional power in the United
States Supreme Court and federal law. In contrast, the CCRI, on its
face, affects "only" the courts' authority over equal protection rights
and does not link them to federal law like the initiative in Raven.
As mentioned above, the CCRI more closely resembles the ini-
tiative measure upheld by the Frierson161 court, which stated that the
death penalty was constitutional and required California courts to
158. "[Clontempt[] is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the
judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on
them by law." United States v. Grossman, 1 F.2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
159. "[L]egislature may put reasonable restrictions upon constitutional func-
tions of the courts provided they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise
of those functions." Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 444, 281 P. 1018, 1020
(1929).
160. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
161. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 740.
162. See id.
163. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326
(1990).
164. Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine of Inde-
pendent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 95, 130 (1993).
165. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
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interpret capital punishment in accordance with federal law.
1" Op-
ponents of the Frierson initiative argued that it "contemplate[d]
'removal of judicial review' of the death penalty from a carefully built
state constitutional structure, thereby resulting in 'a significant
change in a principle underlying our system of democratic govern-
ment [that] can only be accomplished by constitutional revision..' 1 .7
But, cautioning against "too strict a construction of the revision
rule,'.. the court validated the initiative as a proper amendment.
1"
The Frierson initiative was an "isolated provision... achiev[ing] no
far-reaching, fundamental change in the governmental plan.' 171 The
initiative did not "involve[] a broad attack on the state court's
authority.''. The Frierson court stated that it still "retain[ed] broad
powers of judicial review... to assure ... proper[] and legal[] im-
pos[ition] and to safeguard against arbitrary or disproportionate
treatment. In addition [it still] possess[ed] unrestricted authority to
measure and appraise the constitutionality of the death penalty under
... guidelines established by the United States Supreme Court.'
72
The CCRI orders the judiciary to invalidate any measure in vio-
lation of it, prohibits courts from using race- and sex-based remedies
to enforce any violation of state or federal law, and invalidates im-
proper court action. But under the RavenlFrierson analysis, it is not a
broad attack on the judiciary's fundamental powers to uphold the
constitution. The California courts still have the authority to inter-
pret and uphold the CCRI and to measure and appraise the constitu-
tionality of challenged measures or programs under guidelines estab-
lished by the CCRI. The CCRI is a relatively isolated provision
compared to that in Raven, and its effect on the judiciary's essential
power to enforce the constitution would survive an amend-
ment/revision challenge.
b. concentration of power
As noted above, the California Constitution forbids one branch
of government from exercising power committed to another
166. See id. at 187-88, 599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
167. Id. at 186, 599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
168. Id. at 187, 599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
169. See id.
170. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 740.
171. Id.
172. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d at 187, 599 P.2d at 614, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
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branch.'" When proposing the CCRI, the people of California exer-
cised their reserved legislative power of initiative. 4 The legislature
has the power to make laws and declare public policy.Y5 The duty of
enforcement and administration of legislative acts falls on the execu-
tive branch.17 6 The people as legislature made the CCRI "self-
executing."' A self-executing constitutional provision "supplies suf-
ficient rule by which right given may be enjoyed or duty imposed en-
forced. 1 78 The mandates of the CCRI were to be effective immedi-
ately upon popular ratification without any sort of executive
oversight.17 ' Does the CCRI, a legislative initiative by the California
people, also exercise or usurp executive power through its use of a
self-executing provision, and therefore revise the separation of pow-
ers and initiative power mandates of the constitution?
California courts have developed a test, used specifically in the
initiative context, to distinguish legislative acts from execu-
tive/administrative acts: "Legislative acts generally are those which
declare a public purpose and make provisions for the ways and means
of its accomplishment. Administrative acts, on the other hand, are
those which are necessary to carry out the legislative policies and
purposes already declared by the legislative body."'lW Setting aside
the separation of powers issue for a moment, it is important to note
that if the CCRI did attempt to exercise true executive power, it
would automatically be invalid. The people's power of initiative ex-
tends only to legislative measures, not to administrative or executive
acts. "The people have reserved the right to legislate, not to deter-
mine how previously enacted public policies will be administered or
173. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
174. See id. at art. IV, § 1.
175. See id. at art. IV.
176. See id. at art. V.
177. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(h). "This section shall be self-executing." Id.
178. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990).
179. "Proposition 209 [CCRI] is a self-executing amendment to the California
Constitution that imposes an affirmative duty to comply... [and] 'compliance is
coerced by the threat of enforcement. . . ."' Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wil-
son, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1491 (N.D. Cal. 1996), preliminary injunction vacated, stay
denied as moot, remanded, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997) reh'g denied, 122 F.3d
692 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed 66 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1997)
(No. 97-369), cert denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1997) (No. 97-396)
(quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498,508 (1972)).
180. Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, 86 Cal. App. 3d 506,509, 150 Cal. Rptr. 326,
327-28 (1978) (holding that ordinance modifying parking facility development
plans was an administrative act not subject to the initiative or referendum pow-
ers).
[Vol. 31:261
CCRI: A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?
executed." '' Any initiative attempting to exercise executive power is
improper and invalid."
Courts, on several occasions, have found that local initiatives
constituted executive/administrative acts. The California Supreme
Court noted that "[p]rescribing the policy and duty [that county
board of supervisors shall provide suitable quarters for municipal and
superior courts] was the legislative act of the state; carrying out the
policy by performing the duty [of providing such quarters] is an ad-
ministrative function." '' The Colorado Supreme Court similarly held
that where the voters had already approved the public policy to build
a new city hall and raise taxes, an initiative dictating the location of a
schoolhouse to be remodeled as the city hall and prohibiting certain
uses of tax money related to administrative matters was invalid.l"
Conversely, under this test, the CCRI declares new policy and
makes provisions for the ways and means of its accomplishment. It
provides that the "state shall not discriminate... or grant preferen-
tial treatment"' 5 and provides remedies and directions to the court to
enforce this immediately upon ratification."6 The CCRI does not
simply implement existing public policy as did the measures in the
examples above. It lays down rules, gives them the force of law, and
qualifies as a legislative act.
As a self-executing provision, the CCRI excludes the executive
branch's input. The CCRI, an initiative crafted by partisan citizens
involving complex social issues," contemplates serious changes to the
California government and citizens' rights. But it effectively excludes
the executive branch's input with its self-executing provision by im-
posing an immediate affirmative duty to comply. A non-self-
executing constitutional amendment, on the other hand, can "[lie]
181. City of Idaho Springs v. Blackwell, 731 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Colo. 1987)
(holding that where voters approved policy to build new city hall and raise taxes,
an initiative dictating schoolhouse to be remodeled as city hall was administrative
and invalid); see CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
182. See Blackwell, 731 P.2d at 1253; see also Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125,
129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950); Housing Auth. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550,
557, 219 P.2d 457, 460-61 (1950).
183. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d at 130,222 P.2d at 228.
184. See Blackwell, 731 P.2d at 1254; see also Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d
445, 451 (Colo. 1986) (holding that a measure to lease a portion of a park for a
suspension bridge was an improper and invalid executive/administrative act car-
rying out the previously established policy of transferring all operational and
maintenance responsibilities for the bridge to a private company).
185. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
186. See id. § 31(b)-(h).
187. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
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dormant for years"1 until the legislature or people enact implement-
ing legislation or until the executive branch issues an order or regu-
lation to interpret, implement, or give administrative effect to the
amendment."9
Requiring further executive action to implement initiative con-
stitutional amendments provides the same safeguards of which James
Madison spoke. 9' Executive action theoretically provides a filter
with which to enlarge public views and make sure that they are, in
fact, in society's best interest. Executive action would also combat
the tyrannical concentration of power that Montesquieu and Locke
feared."' If both the people, as legislature, and the executive branch
must act to propose, ratify, and execute the CCRI, it would prevent a
single individual acting without law from "draw[ing] everything along
by his will and his caprices."' But since the CCRI does not attempt
to exercise executive/administrative power under the current judicial
test, it would not effect a qualitative revision of the separation of
powers or initiative power sections of the California Constitution. As
such, neither the executive nor legislative "filters" are necessary for
adoption or implementation of the CCRI, and it qualifies as a per-
missible constitutional amendment by initiative.
V. PROPOSAL
In 1911 California Governor Hiram Johnson fought for the
adoption of the initiative and succeeded in amending the constitution
to secure the people this right.'93 The people's power to propose
amendments to their constitution is a very important one that the
judiciary should protect."4 California citizens cannot always rely on a
legislature that is by nature slow, cumbersome, and beholden to
18& Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1491-92.
189. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 568-69, 1360 (6th ed. 1990).
190. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
192. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 134, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
193. See Mosk, supra note 141, at 1. Justice Mosk cast a concurring and dis-
senting vote in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336,356, 801 P.2d 1077, 1090, 276
Cal. Rptr. 326, 339 (1990) (Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting). While he agreed
that the proposed initiative did attefapt an impermissible revision, he felt, unlike
the majority, that the initiative also violated the single-subject rule. See id.
(Mosk, J., concurring & dissenting). By mandate of the California Constitution,
"[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted
to the electors or have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
194. See Mosk, supra note 141, at 1. The initiative "was generally deemed a
landmark development in democracy." Id.
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special interest groups to address their concerns promptly, if at all.
When Californians desire constitutional amendments, they should be
able to initiate these changes themselves.95 Correctly, the courts
"jealously guard the precious initiative power"'96 to amend the consti-
tution.
Unfortunately, this jealous protection has led courts to develop
tests which are not sensitive enough to recognize when an initiative
proposes very serious, revision-like changes to the constitution."9
"As a result, initiatives can easily overcome substantive restrictions
and can be broadly interpreted even if they restrict or conflict with
pre-existing rights."'9 For example, as explained above, the CCRI
conceivably affects both equal protection and separation of powers in
California but would most likely survive an amendment/revision
challenge. The CCRI's two authors proposed serious changes to the
constitution that voters probably did not fully understand'" but did
approve."
195. "The initiative was clearly intended not merely as a right granted to the
people, but a power the people reserved." Id.
196. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 501, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313,286 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 287 (1991).
197. See Van Cleave, supra note 164, at 129. "The California Supreme Court
has not only broadly interpreted specific provisions of initiatives in an attempt to
further the presumed will of the voters, but has also loosely applied the two
principal restrictions on the use of the initiative, the 'no revision rule' and the
'single-subject rule."' Id.
198. Id.
199. See Sandy Sohcot, Guest Opinion, Between the Lines of the Civil Rights
Initiative, S.F. Bus. TIMEs, May 24, 1996, at 39. The president of the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area Chapter of the National Association of Women Business Owners
implored California voters to take a closer, more careful look at the CCRI and its
effects.
[T]he majority of citizens are fair-minded people who truly want equal
opportunity for all citizens, who embrace diversity, and who seek fair-
ness in all of our public policies. I am deeply disturbed by the sound-
bite promises of proponents of the California Civil Rights Initiative that
this initiative is for fairness. I believe this initiative has nothing to do
with civil rights, nor is it designed to further fairness, but instead is
preying on current fears and uncertainties to further the special interests
and specific beliefs of a minority of the population. I implore all citizens
to read between the lines, to engage m healthy debate, and demand
... truth and fairness.
Id.
200. "On November 5, 1996, the voters of California enacted Proposition 209
into law, with 4,736,180 votes (54%) cast in favor of the initiative and 3,986,196
votes (46%) cast in opposition." Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.
Supp. 1480, 1495 (N.D. Cal. 1996), preliminary injunction vacated, stay denied as
moot, remanded, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). The racial and gender break-
down of the ratification was as follows:
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This Comment proposes changes to preserve the California
people's power of initiative and, at the same time, guard against im-
proper and ill-conceived revisions. These changes would prevent the
reshaping of California's constitution, government, and civil rights
structure under the influence of the inherent problems and dangers
of direct democracy-the initiative process-that James Madison
identified.* '0
The people should not directly legislate constitutional revi-
sions-substantial changes-using the initiative process. Instead,
these changes should flow from the legislative houses or a constitu-
tional convention where ideas can be refined and enlarged from par-
tisan, poorly drafted, sometimes unintelligible measures which voters
cannot truly understand. This way, constitutional amendments can
evolve into appropriate responses to complex, difficult policy mat-
ters. The California Supreme Court should modify the qualitative
part of the current test so that it is sensitive enough to recognize an
initiative that makes far-reaching constitutional changes aside from a
total restructuring of the government or constitution.
A. A More Sensitive Qualitative Effects Test
In its current state, the qualitative effects test is as crude in iden-
tifying improper constitutional changes as a surgeon performing deli-
cate surgery with a very dull blade. It asks only whether a proposed
initiative would "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."' By
definition, nothing much short of governmental reorganization quali-
fies as a revision. Less drastic changes to the constitution, however,
can seriously affect California citizens and their government. These
"lesser" changes also demand "more formality, discussion and
VOTER YES VOTES NO VOTES
Male 61% 39%
Female 48% 52%
White 63% 37%
Black 26% 74%
Latino 24% 76%
Asian 39% 61%
Id. at n.12.
201. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
202. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 223, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1978).
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deliberation than is available through the initiative process"' '  and
should qualify as impermissible revisions.
To distinguish amendments from revisions, courts should ask
two questions: 1) whether the initiative in question would change or
diminish basic civil rights of Californians as a whole or of a specific,
identifiable group; and 2) whether it would diminish or reallocate the
power granted by the constitution to any of the three governmental
branches. If a proposed initiative does either, courts would label it a
revision and invalidate it. With this revised qualitative test in place,
courts could identify and invalidate initiatives proposing very basic
and important changes to Californians' rights and government-
initiatives that would not trigger the current test.
1. CCRI clause (c): an improper attempt to revise the California
Constitution under the proposed qualitative effects test
Although clause (c) of the CCRIP' threatens to "eviscerate the
California Constitution's current protection against gender discrimi-
nation,"' it would not, under the current test, amount to a revision.
Even though it would constitutionalize language that places women
outside the normal political process, the CCRI does not mandate far-
reaching changes in the nature of California's basic governmental
plan or repeal or alter the substantial majority of the existing consti-
tution like those initiatives invalidated by the Raven and McFadden
courts.2
Under the proposed guidelines, however, the CCRI would con-
stitute an invalid attempt at revision by initiative. The CCRI changes
and diminishes the basic civil fights of a specific, identifiable group-
203. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,506, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316,286 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 290 (1991).
204. "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide
qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(c).
205. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 7 (emphasis added).
206. The Raven court invalidated an initiative that vested all state judicial
power relating to criminal defense rights in the Federal Constitution and United
States Supreme Court and divested the California Constitution and judiciary of
all power in this area. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 352, 801 P.2d
1077, 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 336 (1990). This initiative failed the current quali-
tative test. See id. The McFadden court struck a 21,000 word measure which re-
pealed or altered at least 15 of 25 articles of the constitution. See McFadden v.
Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 330-34, 196 P.2d 787, 787-90 (1948). This initiative failed
the quantitative part of the current test. See id.
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women. It would "substantially lessen constitutional protection [for
women] against sex-based discrimination in education, contracting,
and employment." The proposed qualitative test would prohibit
the California people, speaking through two authors,. from making
these types of changes to the rights of a discrete group. The newly-
labeled revision would require the consideration and debate of both
houses of the legislature.' In theory, the California Senate and As-
sembly would recognize the discriminatory effect of CCRI clause (c)
and vote in sufficient numbers against submission to voters for the
necessary popular ratification.2 "
2. CCRI clauses (d), (g), and (h): an improper attempt to revise the
California Constitution under the proposed qualitative effects test
Even though CCRI clauses (d),211 (g),212 and (h)213 arguably affect
the California Constitution's separation of powers mandate, 214 they,
like CCRI clause (c), would not qualify as revisions under the current
qualitative effects test. They effectively diminish the power of the
judicial branch to perform a constitutional duty and allow the people
acting as legislature to also exercise executive power. Under existing
jurisprudence, however, the clauses do not make far-reaching
changes to California's basic governmental plan or repeal or alter a
substantial majority of the constitution.215
On the other hand, the more sensitive qualitative effects test
would recognize CCRI clauses (d), (g), and (h) as invalid revisions of
the constitution by initiative. In these provisions, the people acting
as legislature attempt to diminish and reallocate power held by two
207. Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 7.
208. See supra note 12.
209. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
210. "The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the
membership of each house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision
of the Constitution." Id.
211. Id. at art. I, § 31(d). "Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as in-
validating any court order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective
date of this section." Id.
212. Id § 31(g). "The remedies available for violations of this section shall be
the same, regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin, as are otherwise available for violations of then-existing California anti-
discrimination law." Id.
213. "This section shall be self-executing." Id. § 31 (h).
214. See id. at art. III, § 3. "The powers of state government are legislative,
executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not
exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution." Id.
215. See supra notes 133-72 and accompanying text.
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branches of the California government-judicial and executive. By
prohibiting the use of race- and sex-based remedies, CCRI clauses
(d) and (g) usurp and diminish the court's ability to carry out its es-
sential duty to enforce and interpret the California Constitution, es-
pecially the equal protection guarantees.216 CCRI clause (h)'s self-
executing provision excludes executive branch input by declaring
complex new policy and providing the ways and means of its en-
forcement.217 With these effects in mind, the proposed qualitative ef-
fects test would recognize CCRI clauses (d), (g), and (h) as invalid
revisions and prohibit their proposal by the people of California. As
revisions, these changes, like the one proposed in CCRI clause (c),
would have to pass through the California Legislature for superma-
jority approval before submission to voters for popular ratification or
be ratified during a constitutional convention.218
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE QUALITATIVE EFFECTS TEST
WOULD PREVENT A VOCAL MINORITY FROM MAKING
ILL-CONSIDERED CHANGES TO THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The CCRI demonstrates the problems of California initiative
jurisprudence as it currently stands. As explained above, the people
acting as legislature both employed legislative power and excluded
the executive branch's input when proposing the CCRI which, among
other things, diminishes essential judicial power and reduces the con-
stitutional protection for women against sex-based discrimination.
As a permissible amendment under current case law,219 it needed the
signatures of only eight percent of voters to qualify for the ballot'm
and needed the approval of only a majority of those voting for adop-
tion21 This "majority"-just over thirteen percent of eligible voters
in the 1994 statewide election"-may well constitute far fewer than
216. "[It is] the obligation of the judicial branch of government to enforce the
provisions of the constitution even as against legislative and executive actions."
Orange County v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 694, 727, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825, 852 (1973)
(citing with approval Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); see also
Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 478 (Pa. 1969) (holding that it is the "traditional
and inherent power of the Courts to decide all questions of Constitutionality").
217. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990).
218. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
219. The CCRI neither affects far-reaching changes to California's basic gov-
ernmental plan nor changes or repeals a substantial majority of the California
Constitution. See supra notes 98-192 and accompanying text.
220. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
221. See id. at art. II.
222. In the 1992 presidential election, the percentage of eligible adults who
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the true majority of the people of California for which it purports to
act. In essence, a vocal minority, driven by special interests,2 could
place changes into the constitution, out of the normal reach of the
legislature,' which would affect the distribution of power in the
government and disadvantage a distinct group of citizens. A minority
of California people should not have the power to incorporate these
types of changes into the constitution.
By modifying the qualitative effects portion of California's test
distinguishing allowable amendments from impermissible revisions,
courts will have the authority to invalidate initiative measures which
propose serious changes to the constitution. Courts would ask
whether the initiative in question changes or diminishes basic civil
rights of Californians as a whole or of a specific, identifiable group, or
whether it diminishes or reallocates the power granted by the consti-
tution to any of the three governmental branches. If an initiative
does any of these things, courts would label it a revision and invali-
date it.
Without requiring total government or constitutional restructur-
ing, the new standard identifies changes more properly considered by
a legislature possessing judgment of experience and institutional
competence and those which "require more formality, discussion and
voted increased to 55%. See David G. Savage, High Voter Turnout Reverses 32-
Year Slide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A36. Despite an increase in recent elec-
tions, voter turnout has generally decreased from a high in 1960 of 63.1%. See id.
Voter turnout for California's June 7, 1994 primary election was "the lowest ever
for a statewide election." Associated Press, June 7 Turnout Is a Record Low for
Statewide Election, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at A22. Only 35% of California's
registered voters participated in this election, representing only 26% of Califor-
nians eligible to vote. See id. This 26% "decided the fates of 776 candidates for
state office, nine statewide measures and numerous local races." Id. Extrapolat-
ing from these figures, anything over 13% of eligible voters would constitute a"majority" able to ratify proposed measures and elect candidates.
223. See Sohcot, supra note 199 (stating that the CCRI "prey[s] on current
fears and uncertainties to further the special interests and specific beliefs of a mi-
nority of the population").
224. Because the CCRI becomes part of the constitution, the legislature could
only amend or repeal it by two-thirds vote of each house and submission to vot-
ers for popular ratification. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. It would prohibit
the legislature from reestablishing safeguards against gender discrimination in
education, contracting and employment and from reestablishing the courts' gen-
der and race-based remedies, except by constitutional amendment. See generally
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating, as a violation of equal pro-
tection of the laws, a Colorado measure which constitutionalized language mak-
ing it more difficult for one group of citizens, homosexuals, than for all others to
seek aid from the government).
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deliberation than is available through the initiative process."' ' It
would prevent thirteen percente of Californians from placing lan-
guage in their constitution which could seriously, and in the case of
the CCRI, negatively affect the citizens and the government of Cali-
fornia.
VII. CONCLUSION
The people of California reserved to themselves the legislative
power of initiative when trying to gain greater control of their state
government.' Californians' current use of the initiative power, how-
ever, often comes at a cost-a cost that the voters most likely do not
realize when they approve overreaching initiative "amendments."
California citizens actually lose a certain amount of the controls of a
tripartite government-controls contained in the separation of pow-
ers mandate of the California Constitution that prevent the people
and the branches of the government from exercising or usurping
power allocated to others.m They lose this control to whatever self-
interested, partisan minority has used the legislative power of
initiative to successfully "amend" the constitution in a poorly-
drafted, overbroad manner.m
There is widespread disillusionment with government, politi-
cians, and politics. But the California Constitution's system of checks
and balances-both on the power of the people and the three
branches of the government-actually protects voters against the
dismantling of the government and society by unskilled hands.'
Pushing the processes for constitutional change to, and sometimes
past, their limits may seem to combat an unresponsive legislature.
But it is actually short-sighted and can damage both individual rights
and the government's balance of power."l
The people's power of initiative allows them to "propose statutes
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.""uz
It, however, does not allow California citizens to revise-make more
substantial changes to-their constitution. Unfortunately, as it
225. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,506, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316,286 Cal.
Rptr. 283, 290 (1991).
226. See supra note 222.
227. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; supra notes 1-3.
228. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 34-39, 133-44 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 98-192 and accompanying text.
232. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(a).
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stands, the California courts' test to distinguish permissible constitu-
tional amendment by initiative from impermissible revision is not
sensitive enough to recognize very serious changes to the constitution
which fall short of almost total governmental or constitutional reor-
ganization. It allows small minorities of Californians, with money,
resources, and contacts, to propose and adopt significant constitu-
tional changes with relative ease. The CCRI, which with legislative
initiative power interferes with the court's essential duty to enforce
the constitution, excludes executive input, and drastically diminishes
protection against gender discrimination, qualifies as an amendment
under existing case law.23
By modifying the qualitative effects test, courts could screen
such measures from the initiative process. They could invalidate, as
revision, any initiative which changes or diminishes basic civil rights
of Californians as a whole or of a specific, identifiable group or
diminishes or reallocates the power granted by the constitution to
any of the three governmental branches. They could have invali-
dated the CCRI before it became part of the California Constitution.
The initiative power is important; the courts should preserve and
protect it. But they should not guard it blindly, to the detriment of
California's government and citizens. They should use the modified
test to properly identify constitutional changes which deserve and re-
quire more formality than the initiative process offers, measures
which undermine the structure of California's government and the
rights of its people, measures such as the California Civil Rights
Initiative.
Julia Anne Guizan*
233. See supra notes 96-190 and accompanying text.
* Thanks to Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review editors and staff for their
meticulous and insightful help; to Professor Karl Manheim for the tough ques-
tions he asked after reading several versions of the work in progress, and mostly
to Gustavo for always, always supporting me, no matter what I do, and no matter
how many weekends and bicycle rides it interferes with.
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